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THERRIEN, OCEAN PORT AND
THE DOCTRINES OF JUDICIAL
AND TRIBUNAL INDEPENDENCE
The Honourable Justice Robert J. Sharpe*
Shirley Margolis**

Since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 the
Supreme Court of Canada has increasingly been called upon to address the
meaning and scope of judicial independence and tribunal independence in
Canada. In Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of
Prince
Edward
Island,2
the
Supreme Court reached a high-water mark in the expansion of the doctrine of
judicial independence by holding that judicial independence is an unwritten
constitutional principle.
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada released two decisions with significant implications for the unwritten constitutional principle articulated in the
Provincial Court Judges Reference: Therrien (Re) 3 and Ocean Port Hotel Ltd.
v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing
Branch).4 In Therrien, the Supreme Court held that the unwritten constitutional
principle did not require an address of the legislature to remove a provincial
court judge from office. In Ocean Port, the Supreme Court held that the unwritten constitutional principle does not apply to administrative tribunals. Both
decisions represent a considerable receding from the high-water mark reached
in the Provincial Court Judges Reference.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the implications of the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Therrien and Ocean Port. The paper
will comprise three sections: the past doctrines, the recent decisions, and the
future debates. The first section will describe the doctrine of judicial independence and the doctrine of tribunal independence developed by the Supreme

* Justice Robert J. Sharpe is a judge of the Court of Appeal for Ontario. He previously
served as a judge of the Superior Court of Justice and as Dean and Professor of the Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto.
** Shirley Margolis is a law clerk at the Court of Appeal for Ontario. She graduated from the
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the Charter].
2
(sub nom. Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court
of Prince Edward Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial
Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice)), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter the Provincial Court
Judges Reference].
3
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Therrien].
4
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 781 [hereinafter Ocean Port].
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Court
of
Canada
prior
to
Therrien and Ocean Port. The second section will outline the decisions in
Therrien and Ocean Port. The third section will examine the debates left open
by these decisions. Together, these sections aim to situate the decisions in
Therrien and Ocean Port in their historical and jurisprudential context and to
consider the future development of the doctrines of judicial independence and
tribunal independence.

I. THE PAST DOCTRINES
The doctrines of judicial independence and tribunal independence aim to ensure that decision-making is both independent and perceived to be independent.
The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently affirmed the importance of both
doctrines. In Beauregard v. Canada,5 the Supreme Court held that judicial
independence
is
“essential for fair and just dispute-resolution” and is also “the lifeblood of
constitutionalism in democratic societies”.6 In Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui
Indian Band,7 the Supreme Court recognized tribunal independence as a principle of natural justice:
[I]t is a principle of natural justice that a party should receive a hearing before a tribunal which is not only independent, but also appears independent. Where a party
has a reasonable apprehension of bias, it should not be required to submit to the tribunal giving rise to this apprehension.8

While these decisions affirm the importance of the doctrines of judicial independence and tribunal independence, they also suggest that these two doctrines have distinct sources. Judicial independence is linked to the constitution.
Tribunal independence is linked to the common law principle of natural justice.
The following section of the paper considers the distinct sources of judicial
independence and tribunal independence and the way these distinct sources
affected the scope of each doctrine prior to Therrien and Ocean Port. The
doctrine of judicial independence is outlined first, followed by the doctrine of
tribunal independence.

5
6
7
8

[1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 [hereinafter Beauregard].
Id., at 70.
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Matsqui].
Id., at 49.
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1. Judicial Independence
Judicial independence is a constitutional principle whose sources are both
written and unwritten. Over the past two decades, the sources of this constitutional principle have expanded from the quasi-constitutional Canadian Bill of
Rights9 and Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,10 to the Constitution Act, 186711 and the Charter and finally to the unwritten constitutional
principle articulated in the Provincial Court Judges Reference.
The quasi-constitutional Canadian Bill of Rights and Quebec Charter protected judicial independence prior to the Charter and continue to protect judicial
independence today. Subsection 2(f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights provides
that the laws of Canada should not be construed so as to “deprive a person
charged with a criminal offence of the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal.” Subsection 2(e) provides that the laws of Canada
should not be construed so as to “deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination
of his rights and obligations.” Section 23 of the Quebec Charter provides that
every citizen has a right to a “full and equal, public and fair hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, for the determination of his rights and
obligations or of the merits of any charge. . . .”
The judicature provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 protect the judicial
independence
of
superior
court
judges,
though
not
the
judicial independence of provincial court judges. Section 96 of the Constitution
Act, 1867 provides that the Governor General shall appoint superior court
judges. Subsection 99(1) provides that superior court judges shall hold office
during good behaviour and shall only be removable by the Governor General
on address of the Senate and House of Commons. Section 100 provides that the
salaries,
allowances and pensions of superior court judges shall be fixed and provided
by the Parliament of Canada.
Since the enactment of the Charter, subsection 11(d) has protected the judicial independence of all judges exercising criminal jurisdiction. Under subsection 11(d), any person charged with an offence has the right “to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal”. Although section 7 of the Charter may also
9

S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III [hereinafter the Canadian Bill of

Rights].
10

R.S.Q., c. C-12 [hereinafter the Quebec Charter].
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 [hereinafter the Constitution Act, 1867].
11
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guarantee judicial independence under the principles of fundamental justice, the
Supreme Court of Canada has focused on the requirements for judicial independence under subsection 11(d).12
Together, subsection 11(d) of the Charter and the judicature provisions of the
Constitution Act, 1867 provide important written constitutional sources of
judicial independence. In the Provincial Court Judges Reference, the Supreme
Court of Canada found that judicial independence also has an important unwritten constitutional source. The Provincial Court Judges Reference concerned the
financial security of provincial court judges. The Supreme Court held that the
express provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Charter are not an
exhaustive code for the protection of judicial independence in Canada. 13 Rather,
these specific provisions are elaborations of a broader unwritten, underlying,
organizing principle implicit in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867,
which provides that Canada desires to have “a Constitution similar in principle
to that of the United Kingdom.”14 The Supreme Court held that the preamble of
the Constitution Act, 1867 recognizes and affirms judicial independence as an
unwritten constitutional principle:
Judicial independence is an unwritten norm, recognized and affirmed by the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867. In fact, it is in that preamble, which serves as
the grand entrance hall to the castle of the Constitution, that the true source of our
commitment to this foundational principle is located.15

In the Provincial Court Judges Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada applied the unwritten constitutional principle of judicial independence to the
financial security of provincial court judges to find that before provincial governments
may
alter
the
financial
remuneration of provincial court judges, the governments must establish objective, independent judicial compensation commissions to make recommendations. Although the Supreme Court applied the unwritten constitutional
principle to the financial security of provincial court judges, the Supreme Court
did not limit the application of the principle to this element of judicial independence.
On
the
contrary, the breadth of the unwritten constitutional principle articulated in the

12

In R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, the Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 7 did not
provide a more comprehensive protection of judicial independence than s. 11(d) in that case. Since
the accused’s challenge fell squarely within s. 11(d), the more open language of s. 7 did not
strengthen the accused’s argument.
13
Supra, note 2, at 77.
14
Id., at 69-78.
15
Id., at 77-78.
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Provincial Court Judges Reference suggested that the principle could apply
equally to other elements of judicial independence.
These written and unwritten constitutional sources of judicial
independence have given rise to a broad doctrine of judicial independence. In
Beauregard and Valente v. R.,16 the Supreme Court of Canada outlined four
elements of judicial independence: adjudicative independence, security of
tenure, financial security and administrative control over proceedings. Each of
these elements will be considered in turn.
Adjudicative independence requires that the judicial decision-making process be free from interference by the legislature, the executive, pressure groups
and other judges. In Beauregard, the Supreme Court of Canada held:
Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence
has been the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that
come before them: no outsider — be it government, pressure group, individual or
even another judge — should interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the way
in which a judge conducts his or her case and makes his or her decision. This core
continues to be central to the principle of judicial independence.17

The requirement that the judicial decision-making process be free from interference is so central to judicial independence that judges have been given testimonial immunity with respect to their decision-making process. In
MacKeigan v. Hickman,18 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the judges of
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal who had overturned Donald Marshall’s conviction could not be compelled to testify about their decision-making process
before the executive, the legislature, the Royal Commission appointed by the
executive, or a judge in a civil suit.
Security of tenure has both institutional and individual dimensions. In its institutional dimension, security of tenure protects courts against modification or
abolition by the legislature. In its individual dimension, security of tenure
protects judges against removal from office. Section 99 of the Constitution Act,
1867 ensures that superior court judges hold office during good behaviour and
that their removal requires an address of the legislature. With respect to the
removal of provincial court judges, the Supreme Court of Canada held in
Valente that subsection 11(d) of the Charter does not require an address of the
legislature but does require the following:
...that the judge be removable only for cause, and that cause be subject to independent review and determination by a process at which the judge affected is afforded a

16
17
18

[1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 [hereinafter Valente].
Supra, note 5, at 69.
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 796.
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full opportunity to be heard. The essence of security of tenure for purposes of s.
11(d) is a tenure, whether until an age of retirement, for a fixed term, or for a specific adjudicative task, that is secure against interference by the Executive or other
appointing authority in a discretionary or arbitrary manner. 19

Financial security protects against interference with the financial remuneration of judges. In Valente, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a judge’s
right to salary must be established by law and that the executive may not interfere with the right to salary in a manner that affects the independence of the
judge. Further, as noted above, in the Provincial Court Judges Reference, the
Supreme Court held that before provincial governments may alter the judicial
remuneration of provincial court judges, they must establish independent,
objective judicial compensation commissions to make recommendations. The
commissions must convene and report on a regular basis. Although their recommendations are not binding, governments must justify any departure from
the recommendations on a standard of rationality.
Finally, administrative control over proceedings protects against interference
with “administrative decisions that bear directly and immediately on the exercise of the judicial function” such as the “assignment of judges, sittings of the
court and court lists” as well as “matters of allocation of court rooms and directions of the administrative staff engaged in carrying out these functions.” 20
Together, the four elements of judicial independence — adjudicative independence, security of tenure, financial security and administrative control over
proceedings — comprise the doctrine of judicial independence developed by
the Supreme Court of Canada prior to Therrien and Ocean Port. In comparison
to the doctrine of judicial independence, the doctrine of tribunal independence
has been more limited both in its sources and in its scope.
2. Tribunal Independence
While the sources of judicial independence are constitutional, the primary
source of tribunal independence is the common law principle of natural justice.
To be sure, the sources of tribunal independence are not entirely limited to the
common law. The constitutive statutes of some administrative tribunals provide
guarantees of tribunal independence. For example, the Regulated Health Professions Act, 199121 prohibits an individual from being a panel member of a
discipline committee where the individual has taken part in the investigation of
the subject matter of the hearing. Furthermore, the quasi-constitutional Cana19
20
21

Supra, note 16, at 698.
Id., at 709, 712.
S.O. 1991, c. 18, Sch. 2, s. 38(4).
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dian Bill of Rights and Quebec Charter apply to administrative tribunals. In
2747-3174 Québec Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des permis d’alcool),22 the Supreme
Court of Canada found that the institutional structure of the Régie des permis
d’alcool did not meet the requirements of section 23 of the Quebec Charter
because employees of the Régie were authorized to participate at each stage of
the process leading to the cancellation of a liquor permit, from investigation to
adjudication.
However, the constitutive statutes of many administrative tribunals do not
provide explicit guarantees of tribunal independence. Moreover, although
tribunal independence has quasi-constitutional written protection, the doctrine
has no constitutional written protection. Neither the Constitution Act, 1867 nor
the Charter provides guarantees of tribunal independence. For these reasons, it
is clear that the written sources of tribunal independence are more limited than
the written sources of judicial independence. What was unclear after the Provincial Court Judges Reference and before Therrien and Ocean Port was
whether the unwritten constitutional principle of judicial independence articulated in the Provincial Court Judges Reference extended to administrative
tribunals.
In Matsqui, the Supreme Court held that “the principles of judicial independence outlined in Valente are applicable in the case of an administrative tribunal,
where the tribunal is functioning as an adjudicative body settling disputes and
determining the rights of parties.”23 However, the Supreme Court also held that
“a strict application of these principles is not always warranted.”24 Moreover, as
the following discussion suggests, the four elements outlined in Beauregard
and Valente — adjudicative independence, security of tenure, financial security
and administrative control over proceedings — have had a narrower scope in
the context of tribunal independence than in the context of judicial independence.
Adjudicative independence has had a narrower scope because the executive
and the legislature may interfere with the decision-making process through
policy directions, cabinet appeals and budgetary control, 25 because the tribunal
may influence the decision-making process of its members through full-board
meetings or the review of draft reasons, 26 and because, in some situations,
tribunal members can be compelled to testify about their decision-making

22

[1996] 3 S.C.R. 919 [hereinafter Régie].
Supra, note 7, at 49.
24
Id.
25
Wyman, “The Independence of Administrative Tribunals in an Era of Ever Expansive Judicial Independence” (2001) 14 C.J.A.L.P. 61 at 107-8.
26
Id., at 104.
23
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process during an application for judicial review.27 Security of tenure has had a
narrower scope because tribunal members are commonly appointed on a parttime, limited-term, at-pleasure basis, because there are restrictions on the remedies for removal of tribunal members,28 and because the legislature may restructure tribunals. The fact that the legislature may restructure tribunals has also
limited financial security and administrative control over proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the Provincial Court Judges
Reference had the potential to expand the sources of tribunal independence and
thereby expand the scope of the doctrine. In articulating the unwritten constitutional principle, the majority of the Supreme Court did not restrict the principle
to particular judges or courts. It was therefore arguable that the unwritten constitutional principle could apply to administrative tribunals, or at least to administrative tribunals fulfilling quasi-judicial functions. As LaForest J. stated in
dissent:
The word “court” is a broad term and can encompass a wide variety of tribunals. In
the province of Quebec, for example, the term is legislatively used in respect of any
number of administrative tribunals. Are we to include only those inferior courts applying ordinary jurisdiction in civil matters, or should we include all sorts of administrative tribunals, some of which are of far greater importance than ordinary
civil courts? And if we do, is a distinction to be drawn between different tribunals
and on the basis of what principles is this to be done? 29

The application of the unwritten constitutional principle articulated in the
Provincial Court Judges Reference was at issue in both Therrien and Ocean
Port. Having outlined the doctrines of judicial independence and tribunal independence developed by the Supreme Court of Canada prior to Therrien and
Ocean Port, we proceed to consider the Supreme Court’s decisions in those
cases.

II. THE RECENT DECISIONS
In both Therrien and Ocean Port, the Supreme Court of Canada receded
from the high-water mark reached in the Provincial Court Judges Reference. In
Therrien, the Supreme Court acknowledged the application of the unwritten

27

Id., at 106-7. In Québec (Commission des affaires socials) v. Tremblay, [1992] 1 S.C.R.
952, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the lack of testimonial immunity for administrative
tribunal members was justified because of the nature of judicial review and because of the need to
prohibit tribunals from constraining their members.
28
See, e.g., Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199 and Hewat v. Ontario (1998), 37
O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.).
29
Supra, note 2, at 185.
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constitutional principle to the financial security of provincial court judges but
declined to apply the principle to require an address of the legislature prior to
removing a provincial court judge from office. In Ocean Port, the Supreme
Court acknowledged the application of the unwritten constitutional principle to
judges but declined to apply the principle to administrative tribunal members.
1. Therrien
Therrien involved a constitutional challenge to the removal process of provincial court judges under section 95 of the Courts of Justice Act.30 Richard
Therrien applied for judicial appointment on five occasions between 1989 and
1998. On the final occasion, he failed to disclose to the selection committee the
existence of convictions for which he had been pardoned. The selection committee gave Therrien a favourable recommendation and the Minister of Justice
recommended that he be appointed as a judge of the Court of Quebec. When
the Minister learned of his failure to disclose his convictions, he lodged a complaint with the Quebec Conseil de la magistrature to determine whether Judge
Therrien was “capable, in the circumstances, of fulfilling his role with dignity,
honour and impartiality.”31
The Conseil established a committee to consider the complaint and the
committee found that the complaint was justified and recommended the removal of Judge Therrien. Pursuant to the committee’s recommendation, the
Conseil recommended that the Minister of Justice initiate the process to remove
Judge Therrien by making a request to the Court of Appeal under section 95 of
the Courts of Justice Act. Section 95 provides that “[t]he Government may
remove a judge only upon a report of the Court of Appeal made after inquiry at
the request of the Minister of Justice.” The Minister of Justice made the request
and a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal conducted the inquiry. The Court
of Appeal panel recommended that the Government revoke Judge Therrien’s
commission.
On eventual appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Therrien argued, inter
alia, that section 95 of the Courts of Justice Act infringed the structural principle of judicial independence by permitting a provincial court judge to be removed without an address of the legislature. In so arguing, he invited the
Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in Valente in light of its decision in
the Provincial Court Judges Reference. Although the Supreme Court in Valente
had held that subsection 11(d) of the Charter does not require an address of the
legislature, Therrien argued that subsection 11(d) is only relevant in a criminal
30
31

R.S.Q., c. T-16.
Supra, note 3, at 20.
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law context and that in a non-criminal law context, it is not subsection 11(d) but
the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 that should apply. In his view, the
preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 should provide the same protection to
provincial court judges that section 99 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides to
superior court judges, namely an address of the legislature prior to removal.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed Therrien’s constitutional challenge.
The Supreme Court reviewed the requirements for security of tenure outlined in
Valente in the context of subsection 11(d) of the Charter: that a judge may only
be removed for cause after a judicial inquiry at which the judge is given an
opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court also reviewed the holding in
Valente that subsection 11(d) of the Charter does not require an address of the
legislature prior to the removal of provincial court judges. The Supreme Court
found that the Provincial Court Judges Reference had not undermined the
conclusions reached in Valente, but had rather reinforced and affirmed those
conclusions. In so finding, the Supreme Court confined the Provincial Court
Judges Reference to the financial security of provincial court judges:
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court, supra, raised the
specific question of whether the guarantee of judicial independence, and primarily
the financial security aspect, restricted the manner by and extent to which the government and provincial legislatures can reduce salaries of provincial court judges.
A majority of the Court found that for purposes of s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter, judges’ salaries may be reduced, increased or frozen provided that the government refers consideration of the proposed measure to an independent commission.32

The Supreme Court concluded that an address of the legislature is not a necessary constitutional requirement for the security of tenure of provincial court
judges.
The Supreme Court also found that the Court of Appeal’s recommendation
that Judge Therrien be removed was the appropriate sanction in the case. The
Court held that the integrity of the judiciary and public confidence in the judiciary
prevailed
over
Judge
Therrien’s individual interests:
The public’s invaluable confidence in its justice system, which every judge must
strive to preserve, is at the very heart of this case. The issue of confidence governs
every aspect of this case, and ultimately dictates the result.
…
… I am not unaware that this case represented, in a sense, an invitation to society to
be ever more generous. The pardon that the appellant was granted is an act of gen-

32

Id., at 51.
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erosity, of brotherhood, but also an act of justice on the part of society. It is undoubtedly desirable that such gestures be praised and encouraged. However, we
cannot ignore the unique role embodied by the judge in that society, and the extraordinary vulnerability of the individuals who appear before that judge seeking to
have their rights determined, or when their lives or liberty are at stake. Above all, a
person who appears before a judge is entitled to have justice done in his or her case,
and that justice be seen to be done by the general public. That kind of generosity is
not something that a person can be compelled to offer. In the specific circumstances
of the case at bar, the values of forgiveness and selfless generosity must therefore
yield to the values of justice and the all-important integrity of the justice system. 33

2. Ocean Port
Ocean Port involved a challenge to the institutional independence of members of the Liquor Appeal Board (the “Board”) under the
Liquor Control and Licensing Act34 (the “Act”). A senior inspector concluded
that Ocean Port Hotel had violated the Act and imposed a two-day suspension
of its liquor licence. Ocean Port appealed to the Board by way of a hearing de
novo. Board members are appointed for a fixed term of one year, are paid per
diem, and serve on a part-time basis and “at the pleasure of the Lieutenant
Governor in Council.”35 After hearing Ocean Port’s appeal, the Board confirmed the two-day suspension of Ocean Port’s liquor licence.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed Ocean Port’s appeal.36 The
Court held that the ultimate decision to suspend a liquor licence because of a
violation of the Act “closely resembles a judicial decision”37 and that the financial consequences of the suspension could exceed the maximum fine that the
Provincial Court could impose for the same violation. Accordingly, the Court
held that the content of the rules of procedural fairness “must approach those
required of a court at common law.” 38
The Court of Appeal held that the Board lacked the security of tenure required to ensure its institutional independence. In the Court’s view, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Régie determined the outcome of the
appeal. Although Régie was concerned with section 23 of the Quebec Charter,
the Court of Appeal held that Gonthier J. had looked to the common law rules

33
34
35
36
37
38

Id., at 96, 98 (emphasis in original).
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 237 [now R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 267].
Id., s. 30(2)(a).
(1999), 174 D.L.R. (4th) 498 (B.C. C.A.).
Id., at 503-4.
Id., at 504.
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of natural justice in determining the appropriate scope of tribunal independence. The Court of Appeal further held:
Included in [Régie] was this sentence. “Fixed-term appointments, which are common, are acceptable. However, the removal of adjudicators must not simply be at
the pleasure of the executive.” That expression of opinion was part of a considered
judgment on the very point in issue before us having regard to a regime controlling
the same industry. The adjudicative tasks at issue were similar.
...
… [T]he Supreme Court of Canada has decided that appointments at pleasure to
administrative agencies such as the Quebec Régie d’alcool and the Liquor Appeal
Board exercising the power to impose sanctions for violations of statutes comparable to that possessed by courts of law are not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
security of tenure and that for such agencies security of tenure is an essential requirement of independence. I cannot distinguish a fixed term appointment on a
part-time basis from a full-time appointment at pleasure in its effect on the office
holder as it would be regarded by a well informed and right minded observer. 39

The Court of Appeal concluded that since the Board was not sufficiently independent, the Board’s decision must be set aside. Since counsel for the Board
had conceded that the validity of the senior inspector’s decision to suspend
Ocean Port’s liquor licence depended upon a fair hearing before the Board, the
Court held that the senior inspector’s decision must also be set aside.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeal. Writing for the Court, McLachlin C.J. held that the British
Columbia Court of Appeal had erred in disregarding a fundamental principle:
that in the absence of a constitutional challenge, “a statutory regime prevails
over common law principles of natural justice.” 40 The Supreme Court held:
It is well-established that, absent constitutional constraints, the degree of independence required of a particular government decision-maker or tribunal is determined
by its enabling statute. It is the legislature or Parliament that determines the degree
of independence required of tribunal members. The statute must be construed as a
whole to determine the degree of independence the legislature intended.
…
… [L]ike all principles of natural justice, the degree of independence required of
tribunal members may be ousted by express statutory language or necessary implication. … Ultimately, it is Parliament or the legislature that determines the nature
of a tribunal’s relationship to the executive. It is not open to a court to apply a

39
40

Id., at 510-11.
Supra, note 4, at 793.
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common law rule in the face of clear statutory direction. Courts engaged in judicial
review of administrative decisions must defer to the legislator’s intention in assessing the degree of independence required of the tribunal in question.41

The Supreme Court further held that there is a “fundamental
distinction” between courts and administrative tribunals.42 While courts are
constitutionally required to be independent, administrative tribunals do not, as a
general rule, attract the constitutional requirements of the Charter:
Superior courts, by virtue of their role as courts of inherent jurisdiction, are constitutionally required to possess objective guarantees of both individual and institutional independence. The same constitutional imperative applies to the provincial
courts: Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island … Historically, the requirement of judicial independence developed to
demarcate the fundamental division between the judiciary and the executive. It protected, and continues to protect, the impartiality of judges — both in fact and perception — by insulating them from external influence, most notably the influence
of the executive …
Administrative tribunals, by contrast, lack this constitutional distinction from the
executive. They are, in fact, created precisely for the purpose of implementing government policy. Implementation of that policy may require them to make quasijudicial decisions. They thus may be seen as spanning the constitutional divide between the executive and judicial branches of government. However, given their
primary policy-making function, it is properly the role and responsibility of Parliament and the legislatures to determine the composition and structure required by a
tribunal to discharge the responsibilities bestowed upon it. While tribunals may
sometimes attract Charter requirements of independence, as a general rule they do
not.43

The Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional guarantee of independence implicated in the case, since Ocean Port had not challenged the
Board’s independence under subsection 11(d) or section 7 of the Charter.
Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the unwritten constitutional principle of
judicial independence articulated in the Provincial Court Judges Reference had
no application to administrative tribunals:
The language and reasoning of the [Provincial Court Judges Reference] are confined to the superior and provincial courts. Lamer C.J. addressed the issue of judicial independence; that is, the independence of the courts of law comprising the

41
42
43

Id., at 793-94.
Id., at 794.
Id., at 794-95.
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judicial branch of government. Nowhere in his reasons does he extend his comments to tribunals other than courts of law.
Nor does the rationale for locating a constitutional guarantee of independence in the
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, extend, as a matter of principle, to administrative tribunals.
…
Lamer C.J. … supported his conclusion with reference to the traditional division
between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The preservation of this
tripartite constitutional structure, he argued, requires a constitutional guarantee of
an independent judiciary. The classical division between court and state does not,
however, compel the same conclusion in relation to the independence of administrative tribunals. As discussed, such tribunals span the constitutional divide between the judiciary and the executive. While they may possess adjudicative
functions, they ultimately operate as part of the executive branch of government,
under the mandate of the legislature. They are not courts, and do not occupy the
same constitutional role as courts.44 [Emphasis in original]

The Supreme Court found that the legislative intention that members of the
Board should serve at pleasure was unequivocal. Accordingly, the Act left “no
room to import common law doctrines of independence.” 45 The Supreme Court
remitted the case to the British Columbia Court of Appeal to determine the
issues it had not addressed.

III. THE FUTURE DEBATES
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Therrien and Ocean Port raise
several issues for future debate. With respect to judicial independence, is the
application of the unwritten constitutional principle limited to the financial
security of provincial court judges? With respect to tribunal independence, does
the holding that legislation can override the common law principle of natural
justice apply to the elements of financial security and administrative control
over proceedings just as it does to the element of security of tenure? 46 If so,
what is required of the legislature to override these elements of tribunal independence?47 Is it only legislation that can override the common law principle of

44
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v. B.C. (General Manager, Liquor Control)” (2002) 60 Advocate 63, at 68-69.
47
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natural justice or can subordinate legislation or orders-in-council also override
the principle?48 Where a quasi-constitutional statute protects tribunal independence, would the sort of part-time, limited-term, at-pleasure appointments at
issue in Ocean Port satisfy tribunal independence?49 And to what extent will it
be possible to maintain the Supreme Court of Canada’s distinction between
tribunal independence and judicial independence?
The most challenging of these issues is the extent to which it will be possible
to maintain the Supreme Court of Canada’s distinction between tribunal independence and judicial independence. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
in Ocean Port almost entirely limits the doctrine of tribunal independence to
the common law principle of natural justice, which is itself subject to legislative
derogation. Because the Supreme Court held in Ocean Port that the unwritten
constitutional principle does not apply to administrative tribunals and that
administrative tribunals do not generally attract the constitutional requirements
of the Charter, the doctrine of tribunal independence will be far more limited
than the doctrine of judicial independence.
In his review of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ocean Port,
David Jones questions the distinction between tribunal independence and judicial independence:
Is there really a bright-line distinction between “courts” (including inferior courts
like the provincial courts exercising both criminal and civil jurisdiction) and “administrative agencies” — especially those exercising quasi-judicial functions?
What is it that makes a “court” a “court”? What are the limitations on the ability of
the legislative branch to allocate adjudicative functions to administrative agencies
rather than to the “courts”?50

However, Katrina Wyman suggests that the distinction between tribunal independence and judicial independence is justified on two grounds: the distinct
dispute-resolution process of administrative tribunals, and the limited constitutional role of administrative tribunals.51 She argues that these distinctive features militate against extending to administrative tribunals the unwritten
constitutional principle of judicial independence articulated in the Provincial
Court Judges Reference.
With respect to the first ground, the dispute-resolution process of administrative tribunals is generally more specialized, flexible, efficient, inexpensive and
informal than the dispute-resolution process of courts. In Douglas/Kwantlen
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Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College,52 La Forest J. held that the “raison d’etre” of
administrative tribunals is specialization, simple rules of evidence and procedure, and speedy decisions.53 In Wyman’s view, extending to administrative
tribunals the unwritten constitutional principle of judicial independence would
undermine the ability of governments to create tribunals with this distinct dispute-resolution process.54 For example, the part-time, limited-term, at-pleasure
appointments at issue in Ocean Port are common types of appointments to
administrative tribunals.55 These appointments have several advantages, including diversity of membership, the ability to attract participation, increased efficiency and decreased cost.56 If the Supreme Court in Ocean Port had held that
such appointments fail to meet tribunal independence, governments would have
been required to restructure myriad administrative tribunals and the advantages
of these types of appointments would have been lost.
With respect to the second ground, only a small number of tribunals determine rights and freedoms under the Charter and constitutional issues arise less
frequently before tribunals. Further, the decisions of tribunals on constitutional
issues are not entitled to curial deference and tribunals are restricted in their
remedial powers under section 52 of the Charter. 57 By contrast, courts have
always had a significant constitutional role and their role has become even
more significant since the enactment of the Charter. The Supreme Court of
Canada has relied largely upon the constitutional role of courts in developing
the doctrine of judicial independence. For instance, in Beauregard, the Court
held that “[t]he role of the courts as resolver of disputes, interpreter of the law
and defender of the Constitution requires that they be completely separate in
authority and function from all other participants in the justice system” [emphasis in original].58 Similarly, in the Provincial Court Judges Reference, the Court
held that “in order to guarantee that the courts can protect the Constitution, they
must be protected by a set of objective guarantees against intrusions by the
executive and the legislative branches of government.” 59 If the constitutional
role of the courts warrants greater protection for judicial independence, the
primarily non-constitutional role of administrative tribunals must warrant less
protection for tribunal independence.
52
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Together, the two grounds for the distinction between tribunal independence
and judicial independence suggested by Wyman — the distinct disputeresolution process of tribunals and the limited constitutional role of tribunals —
may justify a lower level of protection for tribunal independence in many cases.
However, they may not justify a lower level of protection in all cases. Some
administrative tribunals closely resemble courts in both form and function:
some tribunals have dispute-resolution processes similar to those of courts and,
perhaps more importantly, some tribunals do determine rights and freedoms
under the Charter.60 For such tribunals, there is little justification for a doctrine
of tribunal independence that is far more limited than the doctrine of judicial
independence.
In Ocean Port, the Supreme Court of Canada held that administrative tribunals do not “as a general rule”61 attract Charter requirements of independence,
but that tribunals “may sometimes”62 attract these requirements. The Supreme
Court did not explain the basis for this holding, nor did it explain precisely
when tribunals might attract Charter requirements of independence. However,
at the very least, the language of Ocean Port suggests that the distinction between judicial independence and tribunal independence may be open to further
consideration and development and that the doctrine of tribunal independence
may be open to further expansion. For administrative tribunals that closely
resemble courts, this possibility is promising. If future courts respond to this
possibility, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ocean Port may come
to represent a low-water mark in the development of the doctrine of tribunal
independence, just as the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the Provincial
Court Judges Reference represents a high-water mark in the development of the
doctrine of judicial independence.

60

Supra, note 25, at 116. Wyman cites the National Parole Board and Judicial Compensation
Commissions as examples of administrative tribunals that determine rights and freedoms under the
Charter.
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